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DISAGGREGATING RATES OF RETURN TO EDUCATION 
Abstract Education is effectively used as a discontinuous 
variable in studies estimating the rates of return by level of 
education. We find that the normal procedure used for estimating 
the rate of return to broad aggregates such as secondary and high 
understates the returns to these levels and subsequently suggest 
a procedure for rectifying this bias. We also find, as expected, 
that broad aggregations that ignore sub-levels of education 
result in a loss of important insights about the interaction of 
education and the labor market. 
The main focus of this paper is to identify a flaw in the 
measurement of private rates of return to aggregate levels of 
education and to suggest a method to correct this flaw. What 
follows in this introduction is the placing of our contribution 
in the context of the literature in this field. 
Rates of return are the core of human capital theory, and 
they embody its two critical assumptions that education enhances 
productivity and that increased productivity enhances earnings. 
One can identify at least three strands in the literature. 
First, there are numerous empirical estimates of rates of returns 
for different countries accepting the premises of the human 
capital model and, by and large, using the standard proceedures 
for estimating rates of return. 1 
Second, with in the context of the human capital model, 
there are studies pertaining to the appropriate form of 
measurement. Here one can distinguish further between the more 
1 See for example the compilation by Psacharopoulos (1985). 
3 
conceptually oriented and the methodologically oriented studies. 
The former studies have refined and extended the human capital 
model by modeling and estimating the impact of phenomena such as 
dropping-out, school quality differentials, innate ability, 
family background, sample selectivity and truncation bias, and 
the impact of educational expansion on earnings. 2 The latter 
studies have demonstrated methods of estimation of rates of 
return or a critique of these returns based on measurement 
problems. 3 
Third, there are the studies by scholars that differ with 
human capital theorists on the interpretation of estimated rates 
of return. Thus the the screening hypothsis is a competing 
explanation for the association of education and income that 
challenges the fundamental premises underlying human capital 
theory.4 
2 For are recent review of such literature see Schultz 
(1988) . 
3 The early works include Becker (1975), Mincer (1974) and 
Blaug (1967). More recently Psacharopoulos (1985a) and Mingat 
and Tan (1988) include chapters in their books demonstrating 
measurements of rates of returns. In the more critical vein, 
Schultz (1968) discusses the appropriate form of the dependent 
variable and (1988) the bias resulting from excluding the self-
employed from the sample. Also see Field's critique of social 
cost-benefit analysis in educational planning (1978). 
4 Scholars who ascribe to the screening hypothesis do not 
believe that earning differentials across different levels of 
education are representative of productivity differentials. For 
recent evidence see Berry (1980), Hungerford and Solon (1987) and 
4 
Whi-Ie this classification may be helpful in placing our work 
in the context of the literature, we do not claim that it either 
does justice to the depth and coverage of all studies or ensures 
water tight categorization. 5 Our contribution fits into the 
methodological category since we are concerned with the accuracy 
of measurement of rates of return to aggregate levels of 
education. 
Before proceeding; we should mention that measuring rates of 
return by aggregating school years for the level of education is 
consistent with the screening hypothesis because it allows for 
possible discontinuities in the returns to education due to the 
earning of diplomas. However, as Hungerford and Solon (1987, p. 
177) indicate, these discontinuities are not inconsistent with a 
human capital interpretation of the data. 
Our main objective is not to provide evidence for either 
interpretation. We do show that when education is used as an 
aggregate variable, different sub-levels of education (i.e. using 
finer disaggregation) are more meaningfully associated with the 
labor market than the broader categories of secondary and high 
Gullison (1988). 
Thus Houthakker (1959) deals with both issues of 
measurement and interpretation. Along with refining the human 
capital model, Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985) also find 
support for it. 
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generally used in rates of return studies. However, our main 
objective is to show that the aggregated rates of return for the 
broader categories can easily be misleading if the correct 
procedure is not adopted for the aggregation. The literature 
demonstrating the estimation of rates of return does not take 
note of these issues. 
This paper addresses these points using a recent data set 
from Pakistan. First, estimates of the more disaggregate rates 
of return (including sub-levels) will be related to the job 
market in Pakistan to indicate that the story is richer and more 
plausible than with estimates using the usual level of 
aggregation. Second, the relatively more disaggregate rates of 
return will be compared to the aggregated rates of return to show 
the following anomaly: All sub-level rates of return within a 
given level of education can be higher than the rate of return 
for that level as an aggregate. It is indicated that this 
anomaly results from the way the internal rate of return 
algorithm works. Finally, an alternative method of aggregation 
is suggested which removes this anomaly. 
These points can be established by using either private or 
social rates of return. The former are used in this paper since 
they require fewer computations. 
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Data, method and educational structure 
Primary household data for wage earners were drawn from the 
computer tapes of the 1984-1985 Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey. Details about the nationally representative multi-phased 
stratified random sample are published in the survey report 
(pp.xix-xxii) . 
The standard method of computing private rates of return is 
utilized. This entails first the simulation of age-earning 
profiles for the different levels of education to determine the 
net stream of benefits represented by earning differentials 
between the level of education for which the rate of return is 
being computed and the prior level of education. Apart from 
representing the benefits, earning profiles for one level of 
education represent the income foregone or the opportunity cost 
for the succeeding level of education during the period the 
education is being acquired. These simulations are based on 
earning functions for each level of education using age and 
experience (age squared as a proxy) as the independent variables. 
Appendix Table 1 reports the age-earning profiles to the 
different levels and sub-levels of education. 
Second, from the stream of benefits are subtracted the 
opportunity costs and also the direct cost of schooling. All 
this is summarized in the following formula: 
N Et - Ct 
1: = 0 ------ (1) 
t=n (1 + r) t-n 
Et is the earning differential between consecutive levels of 
education, Ct is the direct cost and earnings foregone from 
attaining a given level of education, n is the starting age for a 
particular level of schooling, N is the retirement age, and r is 
the internal rate of return solved for by iteration. 
Like most educational structures, formal education in 
Pakistan is composed of the primary, secondary and post-secondary 
or high levels. However, the sub-levels at the secondary and 
high levels make the educational structure unusual. Five years 
of secondary education follow five years in primary school. 
After three years in secondary school, middle school is 
completed, and after two more years, the successful completion of 
national board exams earns the candidate a matric degree. After 
each of these three initial levels, there are options to move to 
vocational tracks. After the matric degree, the candidate also 
has the option of continuing to formal college education. For 
the latter, there are three additional national board 
examinations each after two years. After the first two years the 
candidates appear for an intermediate examination (also referred 
to as F. A./F. Sc. or higher secondary). They then either opt 
for the professional or technical streams or continue with 
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general college or university education and can appear for the 
bachelor's examination after two years and for the master's 
examination after an additional two years. Thus to sum up, for 
formal education there are either three aggregate levels 
(primary, secondary and high) or six disaggregate levels 
(primary, middle, matric, intermediate, bachelors and masters) . 
Findings 
Our results are reported below in Table 1. The earning 
functions are not refined by taking into account issues like 
cognitive ability,· family background and selectivity bias in the 
sample. We therefore arrive at crude estimates of the rates of 
return. However, our inability to refine the estimates, due to 
the lack of the relevant data, is not important since the focus 
of this paper is methodological. 
(Table 1 about here) 
First some remarks are proffered about the complex picture 
of the interaction of education and the labor market using column 
1 of Table 1. Column 1 reports the rates of return with the 
disaggregated education variable. Second, in column 2 we show 
how the findings at the level of aggregation commonly used in 
rates of return studies (Psacharopoulos, 1985) contradict the 
findings in column 1. Finally, we show how this apparent 
9 
contradiction is resolved by using an alternative method of 
aggregation (to be developed below), the results of which are 
reported in column 3. 
The rates of return shown in column 1 follow a cyclical 
pattern rather than a directly inverse pattern that could be 
expected from evidence reported by Psacharopoulos (1985) for 
other LDCs including Pakistan. Plausible explanations for the 
pattern in column 1 of Table 1 are as follows: 
1. The middle level, while technically representing a completed 
level of education, may still signal a "drop-out" candidate on 
the market and hence lead to a lower return than the lower cost 
primary level. 
2. A matriculation has become the common minimum qualification 
for most lower level public and private sector skilled and semi-
skilled jobs, which command much higher pay than those acquired 
with primary education. 
3. A lower return at the intermediate level may reflect both the 
higher cost and market saturation. Most successful intermediate 
candidates attempt entry into professional schools (eg. medical, 
dentistry, law, engineering); if they fail to gain admission, 
they may pursue general higher education, if resources permit, or 
else fall back on the job market. The return at this level could 
be lower still if it were not the entry point for a fairly large 
10 
number drawn into the armed services. 
4. The higher return at the bachelor's level probably reflects 
the much higher earnings of those who do earn professional 
degrees. Those with contacts enter the private sector at this 
stage and also command high salaries. 
5. The general master's degree is often a way to postpone entry 
onto the jo~ market by those who were not admitted to 
professional school. Many use the master's degree as a launching 
pad for taking the civil service exam, entering government 
service via competitive interviews, or seeking a graduate 
academic career abroad. Civil service salaries are not 
comparable to remuneration in the professions, the armed services 
or select private sector jobs. 
The unadjusted aggregated rates of returns in column 2 
reveal the usual pattern of an inverse relationship of rates of 
return and levels of education for less developed countries. 
However, the discrepancy in rates of returns between the 
aggregated and disaggregated estimates defies common sensei for 
conceptually, how can a straight average be less than all the 
numbers being averaged? In fact, the conceptual error is 
inherent in the method of averaging. 
Consider for example the aggregation at the high level in 
Table 2, which is a reproduction of the first nineteen years of 
11 
the actual net earning streams used for the rate of return 
estimates in this paper. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Before the stream of benefits begins, there are six years of 
direct costs and foregone earnings (these six years of costs 
range from Rs. 1197 at age 15 to Rs. 3865 at age twenty as shown 
in the column titled NED:H). These costs are less heavily 
discounted in the computation of the internal rate of return, 
since they occur earlier, than the average of net earning 
differentials accruing later. Thus it is not surprising that the 
return to the high level of 12 percent in column 2 of Table 1 is 
much lower than a straight average of the three disaggregate 
rates of return within the high level in column 1. Similarly, 
the aggregate return to secondary is lower than a straight 
average of middle and matric. 
A suggested method of aggregating in estimating the returns, 
for example to the high level, is to sum the net earnings of 
masters over bachelors (m), bachelors over intermediate (b) and 
intermediate over matric (i). Thus algebraically the alternative 
formula for high could be represented as follows: 
65 Et (m) - Ct(m) 65 Et(b) - Ct(b) 65 Et (i) - Ct (i) 
L ------------- + :E ------------- + :E ------------- = 0-(2.\ 
t=18 (1 + r) t-18 t=16 (1 + r) t-16 t=14 (1 + r) t-14 
where for example Et(m) represents the earning differential of 
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the masters' over the bachelors' level. 
The three components of the formula above could be weighted 
by the probability of completing the different levels of 
schooling. Instead of the formula above, the formula usually 
utilized to calculate the private rate of return to the high 
level is as follows: 
65 Et(h) - Ct(h) 
E ------------- = 0 -------------- (3) 
t=14 (1 + r)t-14 
where Et(h) represents the earnings differential of the high over 
the secondary level. 
The general form of the alternative formula can be 
represented as follows: 
N 
E 
K 
E 
Et (j) - Ct ( j ) 
t=n j=l (1 + r)t-n 
= 0 ---------------- (4), 
instead of as in equation 1. In equation 4, j represents the 
sub-levels within a particular level of education. 
The adjusted aggregated rates of return were calculated 
using equation 4 and are reported in column 3 of Table 1. 
These adjusted estimates remove the anomaly referred to above. 
The average of rates of returns to the sub-levels (adjusted 
estimate) lies as might be expected between the range of returns 
to the sub-levels rather than below it as would be the case if 
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equation 1 was used. This occurs because the addition suggested 
in equation 4 increases the net earnings and because the costs 
foregone are lower. 
For a specific examples turn to Table 2. Equation 3 is the 
calculation of a rate of return based on column five, labeled 
NED:H, which is the net earning differential of high over the 
secondary level. By contrast, equation 2 is the calculation 
based on column six labeled NED:HSUM, which is the sum of the 
earning differentials of columns two through four (i.e. 
intermediate over matric, bachelor's over intermediate and 
master's over bachelor's). The first two entries in column six 
are identical to those in column five, which are the direct and 
indirect cost at the intermediate level (rows 15 and 16). The 
costs for the third to sixth entry in column six are lower than 
column five. Consider the third entry of negative Rs. 505 in 
column six. This results from subtracting out the positive 
monthly earnings of Rs. 902 at the intermediate level (column 2) 
from the costs at the bachelor's level of Rs. 1407. In effect, 
since an average return to the higher level is being calculated, 
it is done acknowledging the simultaneous existence'of earnings 
and costs at various levels. 
Finally compare the seventh entry of Rs. 4056 in column six 
with the equivalent entry of Rs. 1246 in column five. The first 
14 
number is the sum of the entries in row 17 for columns two 
through four. The second number is approximately an average of 
the returns to the three sub-levels and therefore is much lower. 
To summarize, even the adjusted aggregate rates of return 
in Table 1 based on equation 2 vary inversely with the level of 
education; the difference between the secondary and high level of 
one percent could easily be due to statistical discrepancies. 
The important point is that the rate of return to both the 
secondary and high level is understated to a great extent in the 
usual method of estimating rates of return to the aggregate 
levels. However, estimating returns at the usual level of 
aggregation, even if correctly done, still results in a loss of 
important insights about the relationship of education and the 
labor market. 
The question remains whether these results are general or 
whether they pertain to the particular data set used for this 
paper. The answer depends on whether the age-earning profiles 
are non-intersecting (well behaved). See for example figure 1, 
which shows the costs and non-intersecting age earnings profiles 
for the primary and secondary levels. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
It is self evident that the aggregate return to the 
secondary level will be an average of middle and matric and hence 
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will lie below the matric age-earning profile. Thus given the 
same costs (ignoring the different foregone earnings in the 
alternative methods of aggregation), the rate of return based on 
summing returns of matric over middle and middle over primary 
will exceed the rate of return based on the net earning 
differential of secondary over primary. Well behaved age-earning 
profiles are a standard assumption of human capital theory 
justified by substantial cross country evidence. If the age-
earning profiles intersected, it may be difficult to say a priori 
what the outcome would be in further disaggregating different 
levels of education. 
Summary 
This paper makes two points. First, if an education system 
has sub-levels in the aggregate levels of secondary and high, the 
usual procedure used for estimating rates of returns understates 
the true return to these aggregate levels of education. An 
alternative approach has been suggested to avoid this 
understatement. Second, using finer disaggregations of the 
education variable to account for the sub-levels within the usual 
aggregates of secondary and high may lead to richer insights 
about the interaction of education and the labor market. 
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Level 
Illiterate 
Primary 
Middle 
Matric 
Secondary 
Intermediate 
Bachelor's 
Master's 
High 
APPENDIX 
EARNINGS FUNCTIONS BY EDUCATION LEVEL 
Constant 
5.15043 
(106.29) 
4.93429 
(53.94) 
5.09901 
(35.47) 
5.54052 
(40.34) 
5.28393 
(53.02) 
5.03763 
(18.13) 
5.29409 
(16.07) 
5.20339 
(6.02) 
4.95920 
(23.22) 
Age 
.07336 
(24.59) 
.09279 
(16.94) 
.08468 
(10.13 
.06237 
(7.74) 
.07621 
(13.10) 
.09810 
(5.94) 
.09441 
(5.12) 
.10564* 
(2.28) 
.10791 
(8.84) 
Age2 
-.00078 .22 
(20.00) 
-.00097 .30 
(13.11) 
-.00081 .29 
(7.28) 
-.00046 .29 
(4.24) 
-.00067 .29 
(8.56) 
-.00088 .32 
(3.81) 
-.00079 .27 
(3.24) 
-.00089**.21 
(1.48) 
-.00094 .31 
(5.71) 
F N 
529.5 754 
322.21 1481 
162.92 788 
240.99 1166 
400.26 1954 
107.33 
89.41 
26.26 
250.30 ~ 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. All unstarred 
coefficients are significant at a 1 percent level. One 
star represents significance at the 5 percent level and two 
stars significance at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 1 
ANNUAL WAGE EMPLOYEE PRIVATE RATES OF RETURN TO EDUCATION BY 
LEVEL 
Education Disaggregate 
level returns 
disaggregate 
Primary 45.56 
Middle 28.72 
Matric 45.05 
Intermediate 37.20 
Bachelor's 40.56 
Master's 21.59 
Aggregate 
returns, 
(usual) 
45.56 
18.88 
11.74 
Aggregate Education 
returns, level, 
(alternative) aggregate 
45.56 Primary 
33.10 Secondary 
32.04 High 
Not~: 1. The returns to the primary level assume zero labor 
force participation for children under ten. This 
assumption seems justified for Pakistan since Kazi and 
Sathar (1985, p. 661) found labor force participation for 
the 5-9 age group to be less than 4 percent. 
2. The data on direct cost were taken from Jimenez and Tan 
(1985, p. 12). This data was for the period 1983-84, and 
therefore there is a one year gap between the earnings and 
cost data. 
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Table 2 
Net Earning Differentials to Different Levels of Education l~) 
Yrs . NED:."INT. NED:B NED:M NED:H NED:HSu:m 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
11. 
12 
13 
14. 
15. 
-1196.8 
16. 
-1231.3 
17. 902.2 
18. 959.6 
19. 1019.1 
20. 1080.5 
17. 1143.8 
18. 1208.8 
19. 1275.4 
NED = 
Int = 
B = 
M = 
H = 
HSum = 
-1196.8 
-1196.8 
-1231.3 -1231.3 
-1407.2 -1266.5 
-505.0 
-1464.6 -1302.3 
-505.0 
1216.0 -4175.4 
-3792.7 -1939.9 
1286.0 -4245.0 -3865.1 
1357.4 1554.7 1245.5 
1430.4 1648.4 1319.8 
1505.0 1774.6 1395.8 
Net Earning Differentials 
Intermediate 
Bachelor's 
Master's 
High 
-1878.5 
4055.8 
4287.6 
4525.1 
Sum of net earning differentials of intermediate, 
bachelor's, and master's 
• Earni.ngs, + 
Cost.s 
Earning Profiles for Different Levels 
of Aggregation 
Figure 1 
Itl 
Shaded areas represent the direct and 
opportunity costs. 
direct and opportunity costs for middle 
direct and opportunity costs for matric 
M4tric 
Secondary 
Middle 
'1ears 
